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Abstract

The dissolution of Yugoslavia has become a textbook example of the power of propaganda in
times of war. The former president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, is famed for “stirring the pot”
in Yugoslavia and is in many accounts uniquely antagonized for his role, while that of his
counterpart, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, is often overlooked. This thesis will give an overview of
both sides’ propaganda tactics (monopolistic control, historical revisionism, and appeals to
emotions/anxiety) during roughly the years 1987-1992, which will cover their rises to power
(1987-1990) and the beginning of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (1991-1992). The aim of
this paper is not to equate culpability, but rather to shed light on and contextualize, in relation to
each other, the propaganda that was one of the central factors in the mobilization of Yugoslavia’s
two largest republics.
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In no other situation can one find more allusions to ancient hatreds and more
attributions to hostility as a central factor explaining the barbarity and inhumanity
of the conflict – weekend warriors and paramilitaries, neighbours against
neighbours, systematic slaughter of civilians and ethnic cleansing as state policy.
It was indeed a bloody disintegration. – Dusko Sekulic, 2007, p. 799
Introduction
The violent collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 was the result of myriad economic, political
and social factors that have been the subjects of extensive academic discourse and debate over
the last two decades, as the epigraph above attests. The mass media’s role in mobilizing the
country’s various ethnic constituents is generally regarded as being one of the most salient
aspects of the conflict. Yugoslavia was notorious for its use of propaganda throughout its
existence, once as an instrument of “Brotherhood and Unity” under Tito and later of divisive
ethnonationalist politics under Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman. It
was their nationalist goals, which at the time were diametrically opposed (Serbia for territorial
expansion and Croatia for independence) that would come to dictate media output and
tremendously influence public opinion in the years leading up to and during the conflict.
The former president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, is famed for “stirring the pot” in
Yugoslavia and is in many accounts uniquely antagonized for his role, while that of his
counterpart, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, is often overlooked. This thesis will give an overview of
both sides’ propaganda tactics (monopolistic control over media, historical revisionism, and
appeals to emotions/anxiety) during roughly the years 1987-1992, which will cover their rises to
power (1987-1990) and the beginning of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession (1991-1992). I will
begin with history: first, I will provide historical context for Yugoslavia, then give a brief
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overview of Tito-era rule and propaganda. Second, I will discuss Milosevic and Tudjman’s
propaganda tactics in two sections: first the years preceding (1987-1989) and second during
(1991-1992) the Yugoslav Wars. This division is necessary to show how ethnonationalist
propaganda served first Milosevic and Tudjman’s rises to power, then their countries’ roles in
the conflict. Next, the paper will discuss the commonalities between Milosevic and Tudjman’s
tactics, and will conclude with a discussion of the legacies and lasting ramifications of the
Yugoslav Wars together with Serbia and Croatia’s wartime mass media.
I use two terms throughout this paper that are necessary to first define here. I chose to
rely on Eko Lyombe’s (2002) working definitions as they are context-specific to propaganda
used in the context of ethnic conflict. Firstly, ethnonationalism— if nationalism is the desire for
congruence between the nation and the state, then ethnonationalism is the desire for congruence
between the nation, the ethnic grouping (which includes heritage, religious and cultural aspects
of identity), and the state (Lyombe, 2002). For instance, Croatian ethnonationalism encompasses
Croatian heritage, Roman Catholic faith, Latin alphabet, Croatian culture(s), and the political
borders within which ethnic Croats reside. Propaganda can be defined as a struggle for control
of minds through control of communication infrastructure by which public opinion is influenced,
swayed, and manipulated (Lyombe, 2002).

Yugoslavia is a country with six republics, five nations, four languages, three
religions, two alphabets, and one Yugoslav— Tito. – Gary Bertsch, 1977
Historical Context and Tito’s Legacy
Yugoslavia came into existence at the end of WWI, where the South Slavic remnants of
the Austro-Hungarian, Byzantine and Ottoman empires converged as one multiethnic political
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entity. The South Slav tribes were historically and linguistically connected, but they were still
culturally and ethnically separate. These groups eventually became the nations that would
comprise the “pan-Slavic” state: Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia (and its two
provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina), Montenegro, and Macedonia. The competing imperial
legacies resulted in the notoriously confusing and fragmented cultural bases that made up
Yugoslavia (and traversed her porous borders): seemingly infinite linguistic dialects, uneven
economic development, distinct cultural traditions, Latin and Cyrillic orthographies, and three
major religions: Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Islamic faiths (as well as their
differing social, economic and political dimensions/ systems).
After WWII, in 1945, the country was reborn as the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) under the leadership of Marshal Josip Broz Tito (1944-1980). His regime
was built on the idea of “Yugoslavism,” which was premised on social unification, political and
economic centralization, and the development of a supranationalistic Yugoslav identity.
“Brotherhood and Unity” was the proverbial slogan of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia-- it
represented the Titoist doctrine present in his policies, rhetoric, and pan-Slavic vision for the
country. Titoism (Yugoslavism) postulated that class identity and pan-Slavism were to transcend
the “traditional” forms of identity extant in Yugoslavia- ethnic, religious, regional, and
otherwise-- in order to live harmoniously in a non-aligned, pan-Slavic space (Volcic, 2007). In
this view, each constituent republic was considered a part of the Yugoslav whole, and its mixture
of ethnicities and national cultures was what made it so special. Tito, with the help of the
Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) within each Yugoslav federation, built upon “this
ingrained sense of national identity in each of the republics, allowing them to foster a sense of
identification with each republic within the context of belonging to an overarching Yugoslav
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state,” (Volcic, 2007). It can be said that, for the most part, ethnic relations were generally good
during the Tito years, despite great differences in economic development and disagreements over
economic policy. After all, each republic had recovered significantly since World War II.
Notwithstanding the more or less peaceful ethnic relations under Tito, “it became
increasingly apparent to the leadership that the former ethnic attachments to national cultures,
traditions, and interests were not to be easily dissolved,” (Bertsch, 1977). Furthermore, many
national groups (but especially Croats) considered Tito’s centralist policies threatening and
culturally repressive. As per his legacy as the “benevolent dictator” there were many unsavory
aspects of Tito’s regime, most of which would later be adopted by Milosevic and Tudjman: total
monopoly over mass media and communications, censorship and repression of intellectual
dissent, clandestine measures and even force to dampen what it considered nationalistic
sentiments (Cohen, 2000; Silber & Little, 1997). One poignant example is Tito’s effort to quell a
Croat nationalist movement in 1971-- by dissolving the Croatian cultural organization Matica
Hrvatska, firing its members that served Tito in the LCY, and cancelling 100 Croat nationalist
publications (Lampe, 2000). In a seemingly counterintuitive effort to prevent more of such
uprisings and to assuage ethnic tensions across Yugoslavia, Tito signed a number of sweeping
federalization measures that restructured each republic’s political domain and allowed them
more control over their own affairs, and afforded them more cultural liberty. By the early 1970s
Yugoslavia more closely resembled a confederation rather than a unitary state (Cohen, 2000).
In 1974, the final wave of federalization measures meant that each of the six republics of
Yugoslavia had its own distinct education system, media system, central bank, and more or less
autonomy over its own political and economic affairs. One of the last common threads in
Yugoslavia was the leadership and cultural legacy of Tito, who died in 1980. He left a haphazard
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plan for Yugoslav state rule in his wake: rotating presidency. The void left by President Tito was
ultimately filled with the divisive tactics of Serb and Croat nationalists as “the mainstream
socialist Yugoslav rhetoric of the non-aligned movement and brotherhood and unity were, from
the mid-1980s onwards, increasingly replaced by the rhetoric of national identities,” (Volcic,
2006). Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia eagerly employed rhetoric of Serbian national identity,
among other propaganda strategies, as the next section will discuss.

Realizing that Kosovo’s political problems reflected the feeling of abandonment
fostered in Serbs and Montenegrins and that these problems had become
psychological problems, Milosevic touched on something that was a taboo topic
for many years: Serbian national pride. – Agneza Bozic-Roberson
Rise of Slobodan Milosevic (1987-1990)
There existed a high degree of ethnic tension in the years following Tito’s death, and the
media played a crucial role in the manipulation of ethnic sentiments and mobilization of ethnic
constituents, particularly in the late 1980s. These are perhaps best exemplified by the notorious
tactics of the head of the Serbian League of Communists -- later president of Serbia -- Slobodan
Milosevic, during his rise to power. Stepping out of the shadows of the Communist Party, his
first significant media triumph came in 1987, which effectively launched him into the public eye
and into power two years later (Silber & Little, 1997). Political tensions had been high in the
Kosovo province for some time, as Albanian separatist aspirations threatened Serbian positions
of power (and, according to Serb media, the Serbian minority population residing there). In this
instance, the Serbs had accused the Albanians of harassment in hopes of eliciting a response
from their government, which was successful (Bozic-Roberson, 2005). Milosevic, at the time a
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member of Serbia’s communist party (the LCY), was delegated the task of addressing the
Serbian and Montenegrin minority population in Kosovo Polje.
In response to the massive protests and street violence that erupted between Kosovar
Serbs and Albanians, Milosevic delivered a speech in April of 1987 at Kosovo Polje that would
prove to be one of the most defining moments of his political career. The town was conveniently
located at an ancient historical site that was the object of medieval Serbian lore: the legendary
Serbian defeat by the Ottomans that took place there six centuries prior, an event that formed
basis of the Serbs’ cultural claim to the “sacred” territory of Kosovo-- despite its 90% Albanian
Muslim majority (Lampe, 2000). Milosevic’s key success was in his use of the media to cover
the speech: first by editing out scenes of Serbs throwing rocks to provoke police officers
(successfully) to make it look like Albanian police were the aggressors, and second by ensuring
the event be broadcasted country-wide on TV Belgrade instead of local news stations (Volcic,
2006; Bozic-Roberson, 2005). In other words, the ostensible aggression against the Serb
minority and Milosevic’s “heroic” response would be seen and heard by all Serbian minorities in
Yugoslavia, many of whom had expressed complaints of discrimination by other ethnic groups
for quite some time (Silber & Little, 1997). In his address, Milosevic (1987) ordered the
predominantly Albanian police to stop beating “the people,” which sent the message that he
would defend the Serbian people against aggression of any kind, not only in Kosovo but in all of
Yugoslavia (Silber & Little, 1997).
Almost instantly, Milosevic became a Serbian hero. His successful emotional appeal in
the speech was the first in what would be an entire regime built upon the rhetoric of
victimization, Serbian ethnic solidarity, and the politics of shared memory: “in Kosovo Polje
Milosevic must have sensed an opportunity in seizing on Serbian fears,” (Bozic-Roberson,
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2005). The legitimization of Serbian nationalism became the cornerstone of Milosevic’s
campaign for president. Following his address at Kosovo Polje, Milosevic began his
consolidation of power, which resulted in a near media monopoly and the overthrow of the
former Serbian president Ivan Stambolic. By the fall of 1987, Milosevic had seized control of
influential media outlets including publications, radio and television stations, among them RTB
(the major television station in Belgrade which had an all-Yugoslav broadcast), Politika (the
most influential daily publication in Serbia), and three other major publications and newspapers
(Bozic-Roberson, 2005). Milosevic disposed of virtually anyone that stood in his way: from
party officials to journalists, editors, directors and actors, and replaced them with loyal members
of his new party (Bozic-Roberson, 2005).
Riding the wave of popular unrest in the country, during 1988 Milosevic delivered
passionate speeches at large-scale gatherings to mobilize Serbs all across Serbia proper.
Attendance of the gatherings was massive (crowds as large as one million people) and widely
televised. A multitude of grievances were aired, and Milosevic “reduced them all to
manifestations of how Serbia and Serbs were suppressed,” (Lampe, 2000). Furthermore, as the
proposed solution, Milosevic “spoke only of the need for re-centralizing authority, first in Serbia
and then across Yugoslavia” (Lampe, 2000). Re-centralization of Serbian authority was partially
successful: in March of 1989 the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina officially lost their
autonomy and were reabsorbed into Serbia, which meant that Milosevic effectively gained two
more seats in the rotating presidency. With its celebrity platform and protection of Serbian
national rights and interests, the Milosevic campaign undermined the already weak concept of
Yugoslavism.
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It was unacceptable to Tudjman’s HDZ, which saw in Serb autonomy, however
mild, the negation of their over-riding objective – the founding of a Croatian
nation-state. – Silber & Little, 1997, p. 96
Rise of Franjo Tudjman (1988-1990)
The crisis in Kosovo and the rise of Milosevic intensified the wave of suspicion across
the rest of Yugoslavia, which was especially pronounced in Slovenia and Croatia. Political and
economic turmoil of the late 1980s made existing ethnic divisions more hostile and new political
leadership more urgent: the country-wide party, the League of Communists, had dissolved,
unemployment rose, living standards fell as average salaries decreased by 24%, inflation jumped
from 250% to 2500%, and food shortages were common (Cohen, 1995). The state of the
economy strained regional relations and intensified the public’s awareness of the imbalances that
had existed for decades— the markedly more developed Slovenia and Croatia resented their
revenues from tourism being sent to finance what they believed were corrupt projects in
Belgrade (Lampe, 2000). It was clear that the future of Yugoslavia was precarious, and moreover
that “the economic discontent of the 1980s became closely intermingled with burgeoning
ethnoregional nationalism,” (Cohen, 1995). Such nation-forward leadership materialized in the
likes of Franjo Tudjman, a former Yugoslav communist party member and JNA army general
who later became a nationalist historian and eventually president of Croatia.
Like Milosevic, Tudjman established his own political party in 1989, called the Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ), which began as a reconstitution of loyal former communist dissidents
whose allegiance was now with Croatia alone, and conveniently financed by wealthy Croatian
emigres and exiles from the Tito years (Cohen, 1995; Silber & Little, 1997). The HDZ was
formed on the basis of Croatian sovereignty and liberation from Yugoslavia’s long-time capital
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in Belgrade. On economic matters, the HDZ was decidedly pro-privatization, which added
another dimension to its attempt to distance Croatia from Serbia. At the core of Tudjman’s party
was the goal of a unified Croatian state that would finally attain its “historical” aspirations for
independence that had their roots in their “1000-year culture deprived of statehood” and former
domination by the Austro-Hungarian empire (Silber & Little, 1997; Cohen, 1995). The idea of a
Croatian nation-state (which the media called “the thousand-year dream of all Croats”) was
what made HDZ particularly attractive to Croats who resided in Serb-majority territories in
Croatia’s southern periphery (known as the Serbian Krajina), as they had long been dissatisfied
with Serbia’s dominance of high-level positions in the military and overrepresentation in local
and federal government (Cohen, 1995; Lampe, 2000).
Tudjman gratuitously employed victimization rhetoric that pandered to such qualms. In
speeches and interviews, “Tudjman did not mince words about his belief that under communist
rule the Croatian people had suffered ethnic discrimination owing to the disproportionately large
number of Serbs occupying posts in Croatia,” (Cohen, 1995). He wanted to emphasize the idea
that Croatia had long been the victim of oppression by outside powers: Austria-Hungary, Tito’s
Yugoslavia, and now Milosevic’s Serbia. Moreover, Milosevic’s consolidation of power in
Kosovo and Vojvodina and the unrest surrounding it worked to Tudjman’s advantage in his
campaign for president, as these events instilled fear in many Croats and “gave credence to those
who demanded that Croatia should abandon Yugoslavia in order to get out from under the
Serbian heel,” (Silber & Little, 1997). The uprisings to the east and threats of Serbian domination
provided Franjo Tudjman with a sound justification for the use of ethnonationalism in his
propaganda campaigns that would prove crucial for his ascent to the Presidency and for the
eventual mobilization of the Croatian people.
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Over the course of his campaign, Tudjman used his platform and title of historian to
strategically “spread the truth about Croatia,” (Ugresic, 1994). Among these “truths” were the
assertions of Croatian victimhood as mentioned above, and of Serbia’s misrepresentation of
Croatia’s history, especially with regards to World War II. For example, Tudjman claimed the
Serb communists had far exaggerated wartime atrocities committed by the Nazi collaborationist
Independent State of Croatia (NDH) of the WWII period: the generally accepted death count (of
Serbs, Jews, and Roma) at Croatia’s Jasenovac concentration camp was around 100,000 (some
estimates go as high as 700,000), but Tudjman maintained that no more than 60,000 people had
been killed in all of Croatia in that period (Silber & Little, 1997). These claims appealed to
nationalist extremists and the exiled war criminals who were invited back to Croatia by Tudjman
and who would contribute greatly to the establishment and success of the party (Lampe, 2000;
Silber & Little, 1997). With the help of these nationalist emigres, the HDZ rapidly came to
dominate the seats in the Croatian parliament, or Sabor, and its influence quickly extended to
key Croatian institutions from which Serbian and pro-Yugoslav communists were purged,
including of course, the mass media.

Once unleashed, nationalism in Yugoslavia set on collision course the two largest
nationalities, the Serbs and the Croats. – Anthony Oberschall, 2000
Serbian Mass Media (1990-1992)
By 1990, the independent press in Serbia was virtually non-existent, and was replaced
with nationalist newspapers beholden to Milosevic’s control (Lampe, 2000). The rise of Franjo
Tudjman and the omission of any mention of Serb minority rights in the new Croatian
constitution incited fear among the Serbian minority living within Croatia’s borders and provided
Serbian media with ample material; they wasted no time in associating Croatian independence
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under Tudjman with the Ustasha movement from fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH) of
the 1940s (Silber & Little, 1997). Furthermore, the return of the emigres to Croatia made the
Serbian portrayal of the HDZ’s goals even more convincing, especially among the nervous Serb
minority population living in the Srpska Krajina region within Croatian borders. To the nearly
quarter of the Serbian population living outside of Serbia proper, the media’s resurrection of
WWII trauma further legitimized both Slobodan Milosevic’s appeal as “protector” of the Serbian
nation, and eventually, use of force against the nefarious “other” (Cohen, 1995).
Unrest and paranoia grew into open rebellion across Srpska Krajina at the end of 1990
and into 1991. The Krajina Serbs successfully recruited over 30,000 civilian volunteers and
began receiving substantial military aid from the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) and from
Belgrade itself (Lampe, 2000). They began staging what were effectively small-scale coups of
police and post offices in towns across the eastern part of Croatia, emboldened by rhetoric from
Belgrade and with the support of Milosevic and the entirety of the “Serb nation,” (Silber &
Little, 2007). Eventually, the rebels declared the region as separate from Croatia, and it was soon
recognized by Belgrade officially as the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina. When Croatian
forces moved to reclaim territory, the Serbian media called it “warmongering” and an attack on
“the Serbian nation,” which warranted retaliation (Silber & Little, 1997). Radovan Karadzic, a
prominent Serb politician (conveniently, perhaps, trained in psychiatry) publicly addressed the
Croatian “threat” in the region by announcing that “the Serbs are endangered again... This nation
well remembers genocide [in World War II]. Those events are still a terrible living memory. The
terror has survived 50 years,” (as cited by Oberschall, 2000, p. 989). This kind of emotional
reminder of Croatian atrocities and Serbian victimhood struck a chord in the turbulent Krajina,
where it served to justify rebellion, and later violence, in the name of self-defense.
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State-run broadcasting Radio Television Belgrade (RTB) and daily Politika portrayed
Albanians as terrorists, Croatians as Ustashas, and Bosnians as vengeful Muslim extremists who
threatened the Serbian nation (Volcic, 2006). This was all in an effort to portray Serbs as “tragic
and blameless victims to an international conspiracy to destroy the Serb people and their
homeland,” (Bozic Roberson, 2005). Moreover, it stressed the importance of military protection
of Serbs in Krajina-- not only by arming civilians, but by gaining the favor of the JNA, which
eventually succeeded (Silber & Little 1997). RTB’s coverage of Milosevic’s frequent solidarity
gatherings was another useful weapon in the mobilization of Serbs both within and outside of
Serbia proper. One of Zala Volcic’s (2006) interviewees had attended these gatherings, and she
noted that the media’s portrayal of them was shockingly convoluted; coverage of the meetings
was constantly repeated on television and was supplemented with nationalist insignia, passionate
chanting, overstated degrees of violence, inflated crowd sizes, and full of effects that generally
aggrandized the situation and incited sympathy for the “plight” of the Serbs (p.318).
The severity of Serbian propaganda’s exaggerations, misrepresentations, and fabrications
intensified over the course of the 1991. While Croatian media diminished the number of Serbian
deaths at the Jasenovac concentration camp (less than 60,000), Serbian media inflated them, with
claims as high as 700,000 (Oberschall, 2000). Rape and genocide discourse dominated in the
press, and such news stories spread fear of extinction among Serbs everywhere (Oberschall,
2000). Stories in influential Serbian daily newspapers (like Vjesnik, Borba) reminded the Serbian
public of the very real brutality of the Croatian Ustashe during WWII, and more stories were
published about present-day Croatian National Guardsmen emulating their atrocities on a
massive scale: shelling entire villages, ethnic cleansing, church burning, stories of rape, of
torture, and of skinning and burying Serbian women and children alive (Brock, 2005). Images
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were manipulated and massively circulated in the press to corroborate the claims of atrocities
against the Serbs: famously, a 19th-century painting titled “Orphan at Mother’s Grave”, was
edited and circulated as a photograph in a daily Serbian newspaper that claimed it was a Serbian
boy mourning the death of his entire family, who were supposedly killed by Bosnian Muslims.
Neither the television, the radio, nor the press showed the atrocities committed by Serbs during
the war (Brock, 2005), and silenced dissident voices at virtually every level (Cohen, 1995).
When students planned a protest against Serbian media control, it was promptly shut down by
the Interior Ministry (Lampe, 2000).

From day to day among the mass of people the fear of Serbian aggression spread,
and also the readiness to stand behind those politicians promising to withstand it.
– Dusan Bilandzic, 1999, as cited by Sekulic p. 808
Croatian Mass Media (1990-1992)
The rebellion in the Krajina region provoked a strong backlash from Franjo Tudjman and
the HDZ, who vowed to reclaim the lost territory and not allow “a single inch” of Croatia’s
border to be taken (Silber & Little, 1997). The events and ensuing media coverage polarized
public opinion still further, and made Tudjman’s hardline stance more popular among more
moderate Croats who now saw the unfolding chaos as proof of a legitimate Serbian threat
(Cohen, 1995; Silber & Little, 1997). Moreover, although at this point open war hadn’t yet
begun, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the JNA was in fact beholden to Belgrade
(having been the military arm of the Communist party since its inception and disproportionately
high Serbian participation) and ready to defend the Serbs in Krajina against Croatian shows of
force (Lampe, 2000). Thus, the stakes were high for Tudjman to mobilize enough support for the
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reclamation of Krajina, and ultimately for Croatian secession from Yugoslavia, in the face of
both Serbia and the Yugoslav Federal Army.
To Croatians, the prospect of a union between the Milosevic regime and the Yugoslav
army was terrifying, as it seemed to confirm Franjo Tudjman’s campaign warnings of
Milosevic’s insidious and conspiratorial plan to create a “Greater Serbia” under the guise of
reformed communist state-building, for which the declaration of the Serbian Autonomous
Region of Krajina in 1991 was the precedent (Lampe, 2000). Moreover, it legitimized Tudjman’s
efforts to “protect” the Croatian state against the “enemy within” at all costs-- first by
reorganizing administrative and police systems within the Krajina region to replace Serbs with
HDZ loyalists at virtually all levels of government, and secondly by retaking, with force if
necessary, towns and offices already occupied by Serb rebels (Silber & Little 1997; Cohen,
1995).
In one of the first conflicts before open war, a failed reconnaissance mission in Borovo
Selo resulted in the deaths of 12 Croatian police officers and inspired a propaganda firestorm.
State media capitalized on the event, allowing it to mobilize the remaining support it needed,
both domestic and foreign. The media campaign that followed villainized the Serbs much like
the Serb media had villainized Croats past and present; according to Anthony Oberschall (2000),
the Croatian press resurrected painful memories of the 1945 massacres at Bleiburg “with highly
inflated figures on the ethnic killings” (p.990). Radio and television used such memory politics
to instill fear, disguised as warnings for the present: depictions of the “Chetnik terror” (the
Serbian guerilla WWII counterpart to the Ustashe) abounded, and Serbs were referred to as
usurpers, murderers, and terrorists (Lampe, 2000; Bozic-Roberson, 2001). Indeed, as Silber &
Little (1997) note, the campaign “pandered to the worst excesses of Croatian ‘Serbophobia,’”
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(p.142). To make matters worse, a new slogan emerged – “Croatia for Croatians only” – that
very clearly echoed propagandistic slogans from Nazi Germany. For the new national flag of
Croatia, Tudjman symbolically chose to eliminate the communist 5-pointed star and replace it
with a sahovnica shield, a checkerboard pattern taken directly from the flag of the NDH.
Despite its neo-fascist undertones, Croatia’s mass media was much more successful than
Serbia’s in garnering the support of the international community, mainly the West (Lyombe,
2002). Militarily the Croatians were outnumbered, so Tudjman had to rely on the help of foreign
powers (i.e. NATO, the US, and Germany) to gain an edge against the combined forces of the
Yugoslav army and Serbian paramilitaries. To win the Western media’s sympathy, Croatia had
to prove that the Croats, not the Serbs, were really the victims all along. Tudjman was able to
produce a new image of Croatia in the eyes of the West vis-à-vis the establishment and financing
of both public and private institutions (such as the Ministry of Information, and the Croatian
Anti-Defamation League) that were designed to create and disseminate images of Croatia and its
history in a more positive light for international consumption (Ugresic, 1994, Bozic-Roberson
2001). They did so domestically as well; according to Dubravka Ugresic (1994), the Ministry of
Information modified Croatian history textbooks to such a degree that they hardly resembled the
Yugoslav textbooks from just a few decades prior (p. 39).

How is it that when the media unleashed the war of words and symbols before the
war of bullets, so many believed the exaggerations, distortions and fabrications
that belied their personal experiences? – Anthony Oberschall, 2000, p. 987

Discussion
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Many Western analyses tend to focus one-sidedly on the mass media and propaganda of
Slobodan Milosevic, while minimizing those of Franjo Tudjman (Brock, 2005). Indeed, this fact
is a testament to Tudjman’s media successes, as enormous efforts were made by his regime to
gain the recognition and sympathy of the West, which were ultimately granted (militarily,
politically, socially). Nevertheless, as this literature review has shown, Slobodan Milosevic and
Franjo Tudjman’s rhetoric and mass media shared many key parallels, both in their rises to
power and during the conflict. Indeed, some authors have even described their roles as
“synergistic” and “symbiotic” (Lampe, 2000; Silber & Little, 1997; Ugresic, 1994).
Due to an enduring lack of definitive and objective information (for reasons of
fabrication and loss/destruction), it will likely always be unclear exactly the degree to which
each side falsified and disseminated the “truth” in this period (Silber & Little 1997). However, a
few items are clear: both parties gained monopolistic control over their media institutions and
were able to dismantle and censor opposition (moderates of their own nationality and nationalists
from the “other”); both leaders used incendiary ethnonationalist rhetoric in their public
addresses, which was successful in part because both leaders exploited legitimate fear that
stemmed from severe economic and political imbalances rather than “primordial” ethnic hatreds;
both countries’ mass media (press, television, radio broadcasts) gratuitously employed
victimization rhetoric and focused one-sidedly on the suffering of their own nation at the hands
of the “other”; both parties engaged in historical revisionism (most importantly regarding WWII)
in their rhetoric, their media, and their education systems (e.g. both rewrote textbooks and
effectively created new “national truths” that are still being taught today); and both sought to
distance themselves from the “other” culturally, vis-à-vis religion, cultural myths and
orthography.
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There are a few key differences of note, however. Croatia targeted both domestic and
international audiences with its propaganda campaigns, whereas Serbia targeted primarily the
Serbian minority populations living in parts of Croatia and Bosnia, and also those residing within
Serbia proper. Ultimately, Tudjman’s success in swaying influential, wealthy emigres proved
useful in his campaign to reshape the international community’s perception and attitudes in favor
of Croatia. Domestically, the return of the emigres to Croatia had a profound impact on political
outcomes, particularly for the HDZ. As Ramet (2011) notes, there are many other key
differences among the two regimes that are outside the scope of this paper, namely, structural
differences, degrees of criminalization and corruption, political culture, and political economy,
all of which has contributed to the rift between the two countries today (p 268).
Tito’s federalization reforms of 1974 and death in 1980 provided a permissive enough
framework and political climate within which Milosevic and Tudjman could maneuver to
regulate their own media systems and dictate output. With no shortage of corruption on both
sides, Milosevic and Tudjman were able to purge moderates and opposition from political,
financial and educational institutions and replace them with loyal cronies, and furthermore were
able to rewrite legislation allowing for their continued consolidation of power and systematic
corruption under the guise of “state building.” Franjo Tudjman was an outright nationalist.
Slobodan Milosevic was a nationalist masquerading as a communist. Ultimately, both leaders
contradicted themselves by publicly expressing devotion to their national causes while secretly
engaging in meetings with one another to discuss the partition of Bosnia. These negotiations, if
successful, would have deprived the war-torn country of the very rights that Tudjman and
Milosevic had sought – and waged a war over – for their own people (Silber & Little, 1997, p.
144).
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Since ethnic problems usually exist within the context of economic and political
crisis, the leader has a choice whether to deal with the problems in the productive
manner or to create fear and hate and direct major frustrations of his people
against specific groups. – Agneza Bozic-Roberson, 2005, p. 396
Lasting Legacies
The UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was
established at The Hague in 1993 to deal exclusively with the indictment and prosecution of 161
individuals from all sides of the conflict. Charges against prominent leaders and politicians from
across Yugoslavia included crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, rape, enslavement,
destruction of property, embezzlement, and corruption (ICTY, 2009). While there is some
discrepancy, as is commonplace with any “official” data regarding the former Yugoslavia, it is
generally accepted that between 130,000-200,000 people died in the conflicts and over four
million more were displaced (Lampe, 2000). The Yugoslav Wars have become notorious for
their brutality, insidious use of propaganda, and large-scale human rights abuses, perpetrated in
large part by Serbia, and to a slightly lesser extent by Croatia. Regarding the wars, one often
hears expressions such as “neighbors turned on neighbors”, “brothers killed brothers”, and
“families were ripped apart” to describe the nature of the ethnic violence in the region. Indeed,
the now commonly used term “ethnic cleansing” was borne from the Yugoslav wars. These
expressions are testaments to the depth with which the collective memory of past trauma plagued
the minds of Yugoslav citizens – powerful enough to disintegrate interpersonal bonds of
friendship, kinship, and shared culture (Ramet, 2013).
The conflict between Croatia and Serbia officially ended with the 1995 Dayton Peace
accords, although unrest in the area persisted and violence reignited in Kosovo and Serbia as late
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as 1999. Serbia continued to suffer significantly after the conclusion of the fighting in Croatia
and Bosnia; it descended into hyperinflation and its economy all but imploded after harsh
sanctions and eventual military intervention by NATO and the United States (Lyombe, 2002).
One year after the 1999 NATO bombing of Radio Television Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic was
effectively ousted from the Serbian presidency and subsequently tried for war crimes at the
ICTY. In March 2006, after five years of trial, Milosevic died of a heart attack awaiting the
verdict in his Hague prison cell. Tudjman served as president of Croatia until he died of cancer in
1999. While Tudjman and Milosevic have been out of office now for almost twenty years, the
propaganda machines of the two late leaders have both had lasting socio-political ramifications
that endure to the present day.
While political relations between the two countries have no doubt improved overall in the
last two decades, under the surface there are still pockets where nationalism dominates ideology
and where resentment, ethnic intolerance and animosity are quite high. Sekulic et al. (2006) have
argued that in fact, ethnic intolerance rose as a result of the war (rather than being the cause of
the war) and has been “slow to dissipate” (pg. 797). According to Sekulic et al.’s research
(2006), post-war ethnic intolerance has been especially present in rural, war-torn parts of Croatia
and in urban parts of Serbia, which he attributes to a combination of the experience of war,
demographic changes resulting in ethnic homogenization, lower rates of mixed marriages, and an
upsurge in religiosity (p. 818). For example, between 1989-1996, the population of Croats
residing in Croatia rose from 74.1% to 92.2%, while Croatia’s Serbian population fell from 12%
to 3.1% over the same period (Sekulic, 2006). My own personal observation during extensive
time spent in rural Croatia supports Sekulic’s findings: much of my cohort of young Croats (I
was born in 1992) – many of whom were born in bomb shelters and/or to traumatic early
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childhood life, raised in fear by devoutly Catholic parents who saw war firsthand— can hardly
be described as progressive in their views of the Serbian “other” (and their parents even less so)
in spite of updated school curriculum, two decades of peace and ostensibly more relaxed
relations between the two states. There are many such anecdotes and news stories circulating
today, but clearly, more scholarly research is necessary to measure how ethnic intolerance has
actually changed in the last decade, with special attention to the new generation of young adults
born during the conflict, and to areas that saw fighting, if there is to be any hope of reconciliation
within these areas.
Now that the former republican borders have become international borders,
ethnonationalism has transformed into patriotism, and the two states appear to be more culturally
separate since the end of the war. The first and most obvious example of cultural separation is
each country’s adherence to separate religions, which becomes especially salient in the context
of the strong association between religiosity and national identity in times of war (Sekulic, 2006;
Djokic 2002). Pew Research Center reports that 84% of Croats identify as Roman Catholic while
88% of Serbs identify as Orthodox Christian (Mitchell, 2017). Intentional linguistic separation is
also a source of cultural distance between the two— what was once called the Serbo-Croatian
language has fragmented into Croatian and Serbian, depending upon one’s political views. A
third example of this separation can be seen in Croatian and Serbian mainstreams’ opposing
interpretations and commemorations of the same events. One of the more well-known occasions
is that of Operation Storm, which took place August 4-7 of 1995, wherein Croatian forces retook
the Krajina region and drove out a large proportion of the Serbian population residing there. In
Croatia, August 5th is considered a commemoration of victory and independence and is
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celebrated as an official public holiday, while in Serbia the same day is one of solemn
remembrance and mourning for those driven from their homes and/or killed.
As Sabrina Ramet (2011) has shown, the two countries’ political paths diverged
significantly in the post-war era, which has resulted in markedly different trajectories for the two
countries over the last twenty years (p. 263). The issue of accession to the European Union is a
good point of comparison of their progress (and lack thereof). Croatia received full candidate
status for accession to the EU in 2004 and began amending its constitution according to EU
standards in the early 2000s. Croatia introduced significant amounts of new legislation to tackle
corruption, provide protections for minorities, establish and deepen separation of powers in
government, indict war criminals, and introduce comprehensive media reform (Ramet, 2011).
Furthermore, in 1999, Croatia implemented textbook reform in an attempt to correct the
“ambivalent way in which the NDH was presented,” although some Croatian scholars question
the integrity of these efforts as they still tend to espouse one-sided beliefs in Croatian victimhood
(Ramet, 2011; Ramet, 2013). Nonetheless, these reforms were the first of many that would gain
Croatia the favor of the European community years later. Croatia officially entered the EU in
2013 as the 28th member state.
On the other hand, Serbia was initially reluctant about joining the EU and particularly
about adhering to its policy recommendations, as it has had a slew of unique obstacles to
overcome before officially being granted candidate status in 2012. According to Ramet (2011),
the continued subjugation of the Kosovo territory to Serbia’s political domain, unwillingness to
cooperate with the ICTY, and persistent, systemic corruption have contributed to its delays in
obtaining candidate status (pg. 283). That is, owing in part to the dismal economic prospects that
followed the conclusion of the war in Serbia, its government became deeply criminalized and
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reliant on black markets, an issue that, while certainly having improved in recent years, still
plagues the country’s development and political culture (Ramet, 2011). Nonetheless, the
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission seems to be a step in the right direction,
and widespread anti-corruption movements indicate that at least the people, if not their
politicians, have an interest in a new post-Yugoslav peace.
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